Obstruction of Justice is a criminal complaint pursuant to the omnibus clause, or "catch-all provision" of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which provides:
Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be (guilty of an offense).
Your state should have a similar statute.
My experience is that corrupt judges do many things to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.
They obstruct justice by using various techniques to render decisions and issue orders that deny justice. They do this to favor certain parties and law firms. They may do it for money or other considerations, or they may do it simply because they favor certain attorneys. For our purposes now, why they do it is not as important as the fact that they do obstruct justice.
These are some of the techniques the judges use:
Ignore the Law
One of the primary techniques used by corrupt judges is to simply ignore the law. One party cites the law and overwhelming case law. The favored party doesn't have the law on their side. The judge simply ignores the law and rules against the party that was legally right.
In one instance, I presented literally thousands of cases that proved that I was right. In fact, there had never been a case in any court where there was a ruling other than one that would be in my favor. But Judge Orinda D. Evans had one and only one motive, so she ignored the law and ruled against me. The same is true with Judges William S. Duffey, Thomas W. Thrash, Joel F. Dubina, Edward Earl Carnes, Rosemary Barkett, Frank M. Hull, James Larry Edmondson, Stanley Marcus, William H. Pryor, Gerald Bard Tjoflat, Susan H. Black, and Charles R. Wilson. Cite Invalid Law
Sometimes a judge will feel like citation of case law is needed to support their ruling. So, they claim a case applies when it doesn't. Judge William S. Duffey has done this a number of times. He cites a case in his orders, and then when I review those cases, I find that they actually proved my position. But he ruled against me because he needed to in order to shield his good friend, Judge Orinda D. Evans, from criminal prosecution and impeachment.
Ignore the Facts
Judges don’t address points raised by parties who aren’t favored. I find appellate judges are even more dishonest than lower court judges when it comes to ignoring the issues, facts, statutes, and case law.
Lie about the Facts in Orders
Lying under oath is perjury. Judges are always under oath, and a judge is supposed to never say or write anything that isn't true. So, when a judge knowingly lies in orders for the purpose of ruling against a party for the judge's criminal reasons, it is a criminal violation of perjury. Each such instance is a separate count. In my case, Judge Evans has committed hundreds and hundreds of counts of perjury. The record filed with the Court proves that she lied, but she gets away with it because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ judges will lie to protect their fellow judge. I have many counts of perjury against Judge Duffey and Judge Thrash as well. Ignore Issues
Another favorite technique is to simply ignore issues in orders. Judge Evans has not responded to motions on a timely basis, and then she takes many motions at once and rules on them. This buries the fact that she ignored motions where her ruling could not possible be explained. So, rather than make up an explanation, she just ignores those tough issues.Judge Duffey often ignores the issues, and Judge Thrash always ignores the issues. Conceal Evidence
A really dishonest judge like Judge Orinda Evans will simply conceal evidence. In my case, she has two documents that will prove fraud by the other party and their attorney as well as obstruction of justice by her. She simply conceals that evidence and refuses to allow it to see the light of day so her criminal efforts are not exposed. Approximately 12 other judges have aided and abetted her in this concealment. Say Nothing in Orders
One of the favorite techniques of Judge Thrash and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ judges is to say nothing. They corruptly call an appeal "frivolous" and dismiss it with no explanation whatsoever. Sometimes the Eleventh Circuit writes a page or two simply reciting history of the case, so it appears it is a real order, and then they write one sentence dismissing the appeal with no valid reason or explanation.
Don't Publish the Improper Orders
The Eleventh Circuit has NEVER published one of the orders in my appeals. When they are violating the law, they have protection by not publishing the order. This keeps it from the eyes of attorneys and other judges who would identify the wrongdoing. Publishing would also make their erroneous decisions precedents for other cases. The whole legal system would be turned even more upside down if this were to happen.
Block Filing of Motions and Evidence
By allowing the favored party to file anything they choose and blocking the filings and motions of the pro se party, judges commit the worst form of obstruction of justice. The pro se party is denied the information needed to defeat the other party, and there is no record of this evidence and these arguments on appeal. Judge Evans, Judge Duffey, and Judge Thrash have done this to me repeatedly. Tamper with Evidence
Tampering with evidence is a crime. Judges commit tampering with evidence by causing evidence submitted for filing to disappear and not get added to the court record. Judge Evans, Judge Duffey, and Judge Thrash have done this to me repeatedly, in cahoots with the staff of the Clerk of the Court. I have proof that orders have been backdated. I suspect that we will discover that the two documents filed under seal in 1:06-CV-0714-ODE Docket #168 have been tampered with or destroyed. Maid of the Mist’s attorneys did a lot of tampering with evidence, and Judge Evans ignored it all. Deny Constitutional Rights
The Constitution is meaningless to corrupt judges. They simply violate Constitutional rights with no regard for the people they damage. All of the judges that I have encountered have violated my Constitutional rights. I have been raped of my rights to due process. I have been denied the right to call witnesses, to testify under oath, to cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence, to file answers to motions filed by the favored party, to file lawsuits, to contact witnesses, and much more.
Violate and Ignore the Rules of Civil Procedure
By violating and ignoring the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence, judges commit obstruction of justice. They allow the favored party to break rules and get away with it. For example, in my cases, the opposing parties have not filed a single affidavit as to facts for the last three years. The Local Rules of Civil Procedure require that all alleged statements of fact in motions and other filings must be supported by affidavit. This has not been done by the opposing parties since 2008, but every motion that I file has an affidavit or a sworn verification. Other rules are ignored as well so the favored parties can get away with just about anything.
Automatically Rule against Certain Classes of People
Judges automatically rule against certain classes of people. The concept of fair and impartial judges is a fairy tale. I have proven that people who represent themselves as plaintiffs in the federal courts in Atlanta always lose. We have a right to represent ourselves in court, but we automatically lose. Judges are simply attorneys in black dresses, and they seem to uniformly hate parties who aren’t spending a fortune with attorneys, so they screw them.
Order Monetary Sanctions against Parties they want to Damage
The criminal judges inflict damage on parties who aren’t favored by ordering monetary sanctions against them. They inflict financial punishment to break people. Judge Evans has done this to me several times, and judges of the Eleventh Circuit have done it to me as well. Judge Duffey is about to do the same to me. Refuse to Disqualify Themselves
The Constitution and case law clearly provide that we are supposed to be entitled to a fair and impartial judge, but the corrupt judges simply ignore the law. They refuse to disqualify themselves so they can inflict damage on parties who aren’t favored. This has happened with Judge Evans, Judge Duffey, Judge Thrash, and every judge with the Eleventh Circuit. Violate their Oath of Office and the Code of Judicial Conduct
Like the rules of civil procedure, a judge’s Oath of Office and Code of Judicial Conduct READ great. But the judges pay no attention to the Oath or Code. When they intentionally violate their Oath and the Code of Judicial Conduct, they are intentionally damaging a party.
Conspire with their Fellow Judges and Judicial Employees
The corrupt judges commit conspiracy with their fellow judges and judicial employees. They often need help from other judges as well as law clerks, the employees in the Office of the Clerk of the Court, and others.
Allow Perjury
Dishonest judges allow a favored party to lie and cheat. The felony of perjury is ignored. This is an excellent way for a crooked judge to allow a favored party who is dishonest to obstruct justice. When the judge knows the testimony is perjured, the judge is suborning perjury when he or she does nothing about it and accepts the perjury as if it was fact. Judge Evans and Judge Duffey have done this as have the judges of the Eleventh Circuit. Deny Hearings
In the federal courts in Fulton County, it is extremely difficult to get a hearing. In six years, I gave never been granted a hearing. Hearings are dangerous for dishonest judges as courtroom observers, media, and the transcript of the hearing will force the judges to be a little more honest.
Practice Simulated Litigation
Dishonest judges don’t issue valid orders, and they don’t maintain legal dockets. I guess this makes it easier for them to manipulate things. Judge Duffey and the Clerk of the Court have done this to me. None of Judge Thrash’s orders are legal. Dismiss Cases or Grant Summary Judgments
Dishonest judges ignore the law and violate the law by dismissing cases or by granting summary judgment. This is done regularly. This keeps the honest party from the right to have a jury make the decision.
Deny Jury Trials
Judges corrupt the judicial process by depriving parties of a jury trial. Juries can’t be controlled by the judges to ensure that their favored party wins, so judges end cases before the people who should win can reach a jury. Judge Evans and Judge Duffey have done this to me, and Judge Thrash is about to do it four times.
Judges are Corrupt
Corruption is the abuse of power by a public official. A legal dictionary defines corrupt as “having an unlawful or evil motive….” As I see it, judicial corruption is dishonesty by a judge. Corruption does not have to be economic in character. A police officer who fabricates evidence against a person he believes to be guilty of paedophilia is not committing an economic crime; and he might do so because he believes the accused to be guilty, and does not want him to go unpunished. Economics is not necessarily involved as an element of the officer's crime or as a motivation. When police do wrong they are often motivated by a misplaced sense of justice, rather than by financial reward. Again, a person in authority motivated by sadistic pleasure who abuses her power by meting out cruel and unjust treatment to those subject to her authority, is not engaging in an economic crime; and she is not motivated by economic considerations. Judges and many of those who occupy positions of authority are motivated by a desire to exercise power for its own sake, rather than by a desire for financial reward. That said, bribery is generally regarded as the most serious form of public corruption.
Clearly, the federal judges in Atlanta are corrupt because they can exercise power for its own sake. They violate the law because they can do so and get away with it.
The Omnibus Clause -- 18 U.S.C. 1503
The scope of the omnibus clause has been a subject of dispute among the United States Courts of Appeals. Some courts have taken the position that the clause should be read broadly to include any conduct interfering with the fair administration of justice if that conduct was undertaken with a corrupt motive. United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950 (1993); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, sub. nom. Phillips v. United States, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982);United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 825 (1980);United States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 419 U.S. 417 (1974). Others have construed the clause more narrowly, holding that the omnibus clause proscribes only conduct identical or similar to the types of conduct described in the earlier two clauses of section 1503. United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969); Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1958).
The United States Supreme Court appears to favor a broad reading of the omnibus clause. InUnited States v. Aguilar, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (1995), the defendant was charged with and convicted of endeavoring to obstruct and impede a grand jury investigation in violation of section 1503 by lying to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Although the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of a conviction under the omnibus clause, its decision did not turn on a narrow reading of the clause. Instead the Supreme Court focused on the government's failure to show that the defendant knew his actions were likely to affect a judicial proceeding. The Court observed that making false statements to an investigating agent who might or might not testify before a grand jury was not sufficient to make out a violation of the omnibus provision of section 1503 since such conduct could not be said to have the "natural and probable effect" of interfering with the due administration of justice. In other words, there was not a sufficient nexus between the defendant's conduct, i.e., lying to the investigating agents, and the grand jury proceeding. Id.See also United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1991).
The omnibus clause of section 1503 "makes an offense of any proscribed endeavor, without regard to the technicalities of the law or to the law of impossibility." United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1989), citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). The clause was "intended to cover all endeavors to obstruct justice" and as such "was drafted with an eye to the variety of corrupt methods by which the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted, a variety limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined." United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d at 632.The principal limitation to the scope of the omnibus clause is the pending judicial proceeding requirement. Courts have given an equally broad reading to the nearly identical, but less frequently litigated, omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. See, e.g., United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971).
Convictions under the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 have been based on the following conduct:
- Endeavoring to suborn perjury. United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Casel, 995 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, sub. nom.Jackson v. United States, 510 U.S. 1197 (1994); United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1990); Falk v. United States, 370 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1966),cert. denied, 387 U.S. 926 (1967).
- Endeavoring to influence a witness not to testify or to make himself/herself unavailable to testify. United States v. Washington Water Power Co., 793 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 and 1034 (1985);United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977).
- Giving false denials of knowledge and memory, or evasive answers. United States v. Langella, 776 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019 (1986); United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979); United States v. Spalliero, 602 F. Supp. 417 (C.D. Cal. 1984); or false and evasive testimony, United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972). False testimony may be a basis for conviction, United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991); however, false testimony, standing alone, is not an obstruction of justice.United States v. Suskind, 965 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1992), reh'g granted and vacated, 975 F.2d 1206, opinion adopted in part on reh'g, 7 F.3d 236, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1129, 1136, and 1192 (1994).
- Falsifying a report likely to be submitted to a grand jury. United States v. Jespersen, 65 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1571 (1996); United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1368 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1979).
- Destroying, altering, or concealing subpoenaed documents. United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 446 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. McKnight, 779 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1984);United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, sub. nom.Phillips v. United States, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); United States v. Faudman, 640 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1979);United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
- Endeavoring to sell grand jury transcripts. United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978).
- Offering to sell a guarantee of a jury acquittal to a defense counsel. United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 963 (1979).
- Endeavoring to influence, through a third party, a judge. United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980); United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam), or a juror, United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 825 (1980).
- Deliberately concealing one's identity thereby preventing a court from gathering information necessary to exercise its discretion in imposing a sentence. United States v. Plascencia-Orozco, 768 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1985).
- Obtaining secret grand jury testimony. United States v. Forman, 71 F.3d 1214, 1220 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950 (1993); United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985),cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1142 (1986).
- Submitting false or misleading information to the grand jury. United States v. Jespersen, supra; United States v. Mullins, supra, or the court, United States v. Neal, supra.
- Refusing to testify before the grand jury. United States v. Banks, 988 F.2d 1106 (11th Cir. 1993).
Obstruction of justice requires acts designed to thwart some aspect of the government's judicial function. Investigations conducted by the FBI, Internal Revenue Service or some other governmental agency do not constitute judicial proceedings. See United States v. Aguilar, supra; United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d at 1400.
The passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) presented the issue of whether the Omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 continued to embrace witness tampering or whether witness tampering was covered exclusively by 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Although the VWPA deleted the reference to witnesses in the main body of the provision, it did not amend the omnibus clause. Most courts that have addressed this issue construe section 1503 as still reaching witness tampering. United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 659 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Moody, 83 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Risken, 899 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lestee, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wesley, 748 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1130 (1985). But see United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 762 (2d Cir. 1991) (defendant's conviction for witness tampering under section 1503 reversed on ground "congress affirmatively intended to remove witnesses entirely from the scope of [section] 1503"), quoting United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1984).
Despite the finding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the enactment of section 1512 impliedly repealed witness tampering as an offense under section 1503, there is nothing in the legislative history expressly indicating that Congress intended to contract the purview of the omnibus clause. See S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 14-22, 27-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2520-28, 2533-35; 128 Cong.Rec. H8203-05 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 7191); 128 Cong.Rec. H8469 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (House analysis of Senate amendments to House-passed bill).
